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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Discovery: Alcohol Test
In Ex paite Rebersak,12 it was held that police officers may request
but cannot demand that a person involved in an automobile collision take
an alcohol test; and that where such person is an adverse party in an ac-
tion for damages growing out of such collision and his deposition is taken
as if on cross-examination, his reason for refusing to take such test is not
material or pertinent to any issue in such action and he cannot, therefore,
be lawfully required to state it.
CLINTON DEWITr
FUTURE INTERESTS
Stirpes - Members of Nearest Class With Living Relatives
Of the significant cases involving future interests only one,
Kraemer v. Hook,1 was decided by the Ohio Supreme Court. This case
involved the construction of the will of Frederick A. Sterling, who died
in 1920, four years after having executed it.
Sterling's will created a trust and provided that upon its termination
the trustee should "distribute the trust estate per stirpes among my heirs
at law, according to the laws of descent and distribution now in force in
the State of Ohio, which heirs at law shall 'be determined and distribution
made as though my death had occurred at the time of the final termina-
tion of the trust hereby created." Since no material change occurred in
the Ohio laws of descent and distribution between the execution of the
will in 1916 and the testator's death in 1920, the court did not have to
determine whether the words "now in force" referred to the date of the
execution of the will in 1916 or to the date of testator's death in 1920.
However, the court by way of dictum stated that it would consider the
phrase "now in force" as referring to the date of execution, i.e., 1916.
When the trust terminated in 1955 the only claimants were the testa-
tor's nephews and nieces and the descendants of deceased nephews and
nieces. The portion of Ohio General Code which was in effect on both
crucial dates and which is applicable under the terms of the will reads:
If such intestate leaves no husband or wife, relict to himself or herself,
the estate shall pass to the brothers and sisters of the intestate of the whole
blood, and their legal representatives.
The Ohio Supreme Court has construed the phrase "their legal repre-
sentatives" as used in the statute to include lineal descendants. 3
12. 150 N.E.2d 869 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958). See discussion in CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW section, supra.
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Testator had a sister and four brothers, of whom only two were alive
at his death in 1920. These two died prior to the termination of the
trust in 1955. Appellants who would benefit by a distribution using
testator's -brothers and sisters as the stirpes naturally contended that the
phrase "per stirpes" required such a construction. Appellees, on the
other hand, who would benefit by a distribution using as the stirpes the
testator's eighteen nephews and nieces (of whom eleven were living in
1955 and of whom seven had died leaving lineal descendants who were
then living) contended that the nephews and nieces should be the stirpes.
The probate court, the court of appeals and the Supreme Court all used
the nephews and nieces as the stirpes. They divided the trust estate
into eighteen parts. Seven of the eighteen parts were distributed per
stirpes to the respective lineal descendants of deceased nephews and
nieces.
Appellants objected to the use of the nephews and nieces as the
stirpes, contending that when nephews and nieces are so used they do not
take per stirpes but per capita. Appellants position is of course, in ac-
cord with the early common law meaning of per stirpes which always
used as stirpes the nearest relatives whether or not any members of such
class were alive. In this case testator's brothers and sisters, under the
early common law definition of per stirpes, would be the stirpes. It is some-
what odd that this same definition appears in a current loose-leaf service
on wills, estates and trusts.4 The court answered appellant's contention
by stating that the shares taken by the nephews and nieces would have
been smaller if there had -been an equal per capita distribution among all
takers.
If all of -the claimants had been testator's nephews and nieces then the
court probably would have divided the trust property among them in
equal proportions. Such a distribution would have been per capita but
consistent with the language of the will.
An analysis of the language used by the draftsman of testator's will is
helpful in evaluating its construction by the court. First, the trust estate
was to be distributed upon -the termination of the trust to testator's heirs
determined under the statute of descent and distribution in effect at the
execution of the will, but on the assumption that testator died at the
termination of the trust. This gift to testator's heirs determined as of
a time after his death is ambiguous.5 These heirs might take equally, i.e.,
1. 168 Ohio St. 221, 152 N.E.2d 430 (1958).
2. § 8574.
3. Hasse v. Morison, 110 Ohio St. 153, 143 N.E. 551 (1924).
4. 2 PRENTcE HALL, WILLS, E STATES AND TRUSTS SERVICE § 2697.3.
5. 2 SIMES AND SMrrH, THE LAW OF FuTuRE INTEREST § 747 (2d ed. 1956).
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per capita, in which case each nephew, niece, grand-nephew and grand-
niece would receive the same share. Or they might take per stirpes as
at the common law so that all would take by representation with testator's
brothers and sisters as the stirpes. Lastly, distribution might be per
stirpes in accordance with the Ohio statute of descent and distribution in
effect at the execution of the will. This latter type of distribution has
been called per capita among the nephews and nieces (the nearest class
of relatives with living members) and per stirpes among the issue of
deceased nephews and nieces.6 It was this type of distribution that
testator apparently desired, though his intention might have been ex-
pressed more dearly.
The litigation in Kraemer v. Hook arose because of the evolutionary
changing of the early and original meaning in English common law of
the phrase per stirpes. At early common law per stirpes probably had
only one meaning which when applied to the facts of Kraemer v. Hook
would require a distribution using testator's brothers and sisters as the
stirpes. This early meaning of per stirpes is evident in the following
quotation from Hasse v. Morison decided in 1924:
In view of the fact that these next of kin of the intestate take by repre-
sentation of their fathers and mothers, who were the brothers and sisters of
the intestate, it might seem that they would take per stirpes, but legisla-
tive action has provided a different rule....:
In 1958, thirty-four years after Hasse v. Morison, the Ohio Supreme
Court assumes that the primary meaning of per stirpes is a distribution
on an equal basis among -the nearest living relatives with the issue of each
deceased relative of this class taking their parent's share by representa-
tion. Furthermore, in 1958 the court criticizes -its 1924 terminology.
But it is careful to state that while some of its language and terminology
may vary slightly from the language and terminology used in its earlier
cases, "it can not be emphasized too strongly, however, that these slight
variations do not affect any basic premises which have heretofore been
followed by the court." Gifts to testator's "children per stirpes" or to
testator's "issue per stirpes" undoubtedly appear in Ohio wills, inter vivos
trusts, and insurance policies. The writer believes -that in all of these
cases the phrase per stirpes should be construed as meaning that the
stirpes are determined by the nearest class of which there is a living
claimant and whenever all claimants are equally related to the testator or
the settlor, as the case may be, they should -take equally or per capita. This
method of distribution should more accurately have been called -per capita
with right of representation to distinguish it from early common law
6. Hasse v. Morison, 110 Ohio St. 153, 143 N.E. 551 (1924).
7. Id. at 166.
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per stirpes distribution and straight per capita distribution.8 Perhaps,
legislation so defining the phrase "per stirpes" might be timely.
Another timely problem for legislators and lawyers is whether an
intestate, a testator or settlor today would desire an unequal distribution
among grandchildren who take as representatives of their deceased par-
ents. For example, assume that at intestates death, his heirs are two chil-
dren and six grandchildren. One of the six grandchildren is the child of
one of the two deceased children of the intestate; five grandchildren are
children of the other deceased child. Under any form of per stirpes
distribution -the two living children would receive one-fourth each. One
grandchild would receive one-fourth also, but five grandchildren would
receive one-twentieth each. There is reason to believe that a testator
normally would want all grandchildren treated equallyY If this were
done in our illustration each grandchild would receive one-sixth of one-
half, or one-twelfth. The writer believes that the various states should
change their statutes of descent and distribution to provide for equal
distribution among grandchildren in situations where they now take un-
equally as representatives of their deceased parents. Draftsmen of wills
and trusts, however, need not wait for statutory change. It is important
that each testator and settlor be asked to state dearly 'how he wants his
property distributed when certain members of a class are dead but sur-
vived 'by descendants. 10
Failure of Remainderman to Survive Life Beneficiary
The case of In re Estate of Morton,1 decided by the court of appeals,
involved the construction of a will in which testatrix first gave all the
residue of her property to her husband for his life if 'he survived her.
Textatrix disposed of the remainder as follows:
. then at the decease of my husband, or at my decease if he shall not
survive me, all my estate, real, personal or mixed, shall go to and be
equally divided between my two children, M. 0. Devers, and Rosamond
D. Moak, the issue of a deceased standing in the place of the parent'
Testatrix was survived 'by her husband, her son and her married
daughter. The son who predeceased his father gave all his property to his
widow by will. The son, however, was also survived by three children
8. ATKINSON, WILLS 68 (2d ed. 1953).
9. ATKINSON, WILLS 65 (2d ed. 1953); Wormser, Planning for Your Children's
Future, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Nov. 21, 1958) 60, 130.
10. WORMSER, Planning for Your Children's Future, U. S. NEWs & WORLD RE-
PORT (Nov. 21, 1958) 60, 131.
11. 105 Ohio App. 438, 152 N.E.2d 683 (1957).
12. 105 Ohio App. 438, 439, 152 N.E.2d 683, 684.
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who claimed their father's share of the remainder given to him by the
testatrix' will. The court had to determine first whether the son took an
indefeasibly vested remainder when he survived his mother. It decided
that under the terms of testatrix' will he did not. The position taken
by the court is in accordance with the majority view that when a will either
expressly or by implication provides for survival by a remainderman, the
remainderman to take must survive the life beneficiary and not merely
the testator.13  This is true whether survival to the termination of the
life estate is a condition precedent or nonsurvival is an event of defeas-
ance, i. e. a condition subsequent. The court then should have considered
the question whether the son and the son's issue took alternate contingent
remainders with survival by the son to the time of distribution, i.e. the
death of the life beneficiary, a condition precedent to his taking or whether
the son took a vested remainder which would be divested in favor of his
issue's executory interest if he predeceased the life beneficiary and was
survived by issue.14
After th@ court decided that the son, who predeceased the life bene-
ficiary survived by issue, did not acquire an indefeasible fee simple estate
in remainder by surviving -the testatrix, his mother, it would necessarily
follow that the son's issue would take under either of the two possible
constructions. Therefore, the possible explanation available to the court
in support of its decision in favor of the son's issue might have been
that since the son's issue would take under either of two possible con-
structions the court found it unnecessary to choose between these two.
Unfortunately the court of appeals did not clearly see the question before
it as is evident from this quotation:
The question at issue is whether M. 0. Devers, during his lifetime, ac-
quired a vested interest in the other one-half of the remainder. If so, that
interest passed by will to his widow... but if he had only a contingent
remainder, then, at the death of the life tenant, his surviving children
would take.'
A possbile construction of the language before the court is that the son
received a vested remainder subject to complete divestment in favor of
his issue if he predeceased the life beneficiary and was survived by issue.
The words "shall go to and be equally divided between" normally would
be construed as referring to enjoyment or possession and not to vesting
in interest.'6 Of course if testatrix had made the gift to her "surviving
children and to the issue of any child who predeceases the life benefici-
13. 2 SIMEs AND SMITH, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 577 (2d ed. 1956).
14. Annot. 109 A.L.R. 5 (1937); annot. 47 A.L.R.2d 902 (1956).
15. 105 Ohio App. 438, 439, 152 N.E.2d 683, 685.
16. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 260 (1940); SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS §5 144, 593, 657, 658 (2d ed. 1956).
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ary," the construction by the court of appeals that survival by the son to
the death of his father was a condition precedent would have been in
accordance with accepted rules of construction.' 7 Also, survivorship as
a condition precedent might have been implied if the gift of the re-
mainder had been in the alternative, -that is, to the son or his issue.'
8
There is certainly confusion in the cases involving the implication of
survivorship as a condition precedent.19 But, the writer believes that
when there is a gift of a remainder to a named person with a gift to this
person's issue if he does not survive the life beneficiary and the gift to the
issue is not clearly substitutional, the remainder to the named person
should be construed as vested subject to divestment.20
When in a will there is a gift -by 'T to B for life then to C and D
in fee simple and on the death of either survived by issue to his issue,"
there are several questions in addition to those already considered which
might arise and which the draftsman should have considered. First, if
either C or D or both of them predecease B survived by no issue, who
takes?2' If either C or D predeceases B survived by issue, must the
issue survive B to take? 2
Draftsmen should certainly be aware of these questions and should
state gifts of future interests in language that clearly provides for the
disposition of the subject of the gifts whatever the facts may be at the
time for distribution.
Life Tenant - Effect of Power of Sale and Disposition
There is in Ohio a long line of decisions holding that powers of sale
and disposition in life tenants which appear to be unlimited are im-
pliedly restricted to sales of the property for the support of the life bene-
17. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 250 (1940); 1 SnIEs AND SzaTH, THE LAW OF
FUTJRE INTEREST § 153 (2d ed. 1956); 3 PAGE ON WILLS § 1281 (3d ed. 1941).
18. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 252 (1940); 2 SIMEs AND SMITH, THE LAw OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 581, (2d ed. 1956).
19. 2 Snims AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTEREST § 576 (2d ed. 1956).
20. Millison v. Drake, 123 Ohio St. 249, 174 N.E. 776 (1931); RESTATEMENT,
PROPERTY § 254 (1940); 2 SiMEs AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS
§ 583 (2d ed. 1956); 3 PAGE, WILLS § 1266 (3d ed. 1941).
21. If there is an implied condition precedent that C and D must survive B to take,
then if they predecease B survived by no issue the subject of the gift will pass under
any residuary clause in T's will or as T's intestate property when there is no residuary
clause. On the other hand if C and D received vested remainders subject to divest-
ment only upon their predeceasing the life beneficiary survived by issue, when either
or both die survived by issue the subject of the gift passes either under their re-
spective wills or, if they died intestate, to their respective heirs. 2 SIMEs AND SMITH,
THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 581 (2d ed. 1956); RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY
§ 254 (1940).
22. 2 SimEs AND SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 659 (2d ed. 1956).
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ficiaries. 3 These early cases probably represent the general construction
prevalent at the -time of the execution in the nineteenth century of the
documents which set forth the powers. Today the attitude toward powers
of sale and disposition is not the same as it formerly was. In view of
the substantial tax savings which result from the marital deduction when
the surviving spouse has a life estate and complete power of disposition,
courts today should not be inclined to restrict by implication broad
powers. Perhaps Windnagel v. WindnageZ2 4 represents -the conflict be-
tween the modern and the older approach to the construction of grants
of broad powers to life -tenants.
The Windnagel case involved a will executed in 1910 by Gottlieb
Windnagel who obviously had no thought of any marital deduction. The
pertinent portion of the will reads as follows:
ITEM I
I give, devise and bequeath to my wife, Fredericka Windnagel all my
estate, both personal, real and mixed, hereby authorizing and empowering
her to sell and convey by proper instruments, of conveyance, any and all
personal property which I may leave, and to re-invest the proceeds thereof,
and to change said investments from time to time in such manner and form
as she may desire, and authorizing and empowering her to use and dis-
pose of for her own welfare and benefits, and for such purposes as she may
wish, all of said property both real, personal and mixed, without being
required to account for said property or the disposition of the same to any
other person or persons, hereby giving and granting unto her as full and
complete power and authority to control, manage and deal with my estate
as I now personally possess.
ITEM II
After the death of my said wife, Fredericka Windnagel, I give, devise
and bequeath all of my said estate, and the proceeds thereof, which may
be in the possession and under the control of my said wife at the time of
her death, to my children ....
Testator died in 1913. In 1936 testator's widow conveyed by separate
deeds to two sons and a daughter some of the land which she received
under her husband's will. None of these grantees paid any valuable con-
sideration. After the widow's death the heirs of another deceased son
brought an action for partition in the common pleas court, claiming an
undivided one-fourth interest in all the land conveyed -by testator's widow
as gifts to the two sons and daughter. The lower court held for the
defendants but the court of appeals, on -the basis of the long line of de-
cisions restricting broad powers of sale, reversed the common pleas court.
The Windnagel case should be a warning to all draftsmen who seek
to obtain for their clients the tax benefits of the marital deduction to use
23. Huston v. Craighead, 23 Ohio St. 198 (1872); Johnson v. Johnson, 51 Ohio
St. 446, 38 N.E. 61 (1894).
24. 104 Ohio App. 22, 146 N.E.2d 457 (1957).
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